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                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 11-1296 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHAWN BRYANT, 
 
Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District for New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-10-cr-00233-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Robert B. Kugler 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 27, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed : October 28, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Shawn Bryant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was ultimately sentenced to 110 months’ 
imprisonment. In this appeal from Bryant’s sentence, his counsel has filed a motion to 
withdraw, accompanied by a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
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arguing that there are no meritorious issues for this Court to resolve. We have reviewed 
the possible contentions outlined by counsel and agree that the issues presented are 
frivolous. Accordingly, we will affirm Bryant’s sentence and grant counsel’s motion to 
withdraw.  
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the 
proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, we will 
revisit them only briefly. On August 30, 2009, Shawn Bryant was arrested in connection 
with a shootout in Camden, New Jersey. Bryant initially bolted from the police, in the 
process jettisoning a handgun and 26 pouches of marijuana beneath automobiles that he 
fled past. After apprehending Bryant, the police discovered 47 small bags of crack 
cocaine on his person.  
 The government charged Bryant only with possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon as part of a plea agreement. In exchange for Bryant’s guilty plea, the government 
agreed not to charge him with additional drug crimes and the use of a firearm during 
those crimes. As part of the plea agreement, Bryant agreed to a base offense level of 24. 
The government reserved the right to contend that Bryant used or possessed the firearm 
in connection with his other felony offenses, and Bryant reserved the right to move for a 
downward departure based on overstatement of criminal history under U.S.S.G. §  4A1.3. 
The parties also agreed to a limited appellate waiver which does not bar this appeal. 
 At sentencing, Bryant withdrew prior objections to the Probation Department’s 
enhancement recommendations and stipulated that the proposed enhancement applied. 
Bryant moved for a downward departure, which the District Court denied based on his 
extensive criminal history. Bryant highlighted mitigating sentencing factors, pursuant to 
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and contended that he deserved a sentence of 96 months’ 
imprisonment. The District Court concluded that no departure was appropriate and 
instead sentenced Bryant to the lowest possible Guidelines sentence: 110 months. 
On appeal, we have briefs from the government and from Bryant’s counsel, who seeks 
withdrawal. Bryant has not filed a pro se brief.  
II. 
In Anders, the Supreme Court established a procedure for defense counsel to 
follow if she concludes that an appeal would be fruitless. See 386 U.S. at 744. Under 
Anders, counsel must submit a brief referring to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal. See id. The brief must (1) “satisfy the [C]ourt that counsel 
has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,” United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001); (2) identify any “issue[s] arguably supporting 
the appeal even though the appeal was wholly frivolous,” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 
259, 285 (2000); and (3) “explain . . . why the issues are frivolous,” United States v. 
Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780-781 (3d Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Coleman
After conducting a thorough review of the record, we are persuaded that counsel’s 
brief correctly identifies and rejects the issues that might have been appealed. Counsel 
correctly concludes that, following an unconditional guilty plea, a defendant is limited to 
three appealable issues: (1) the District Court’s jurisdiction, (2) the validity of his plea, 
and (3) the reasonableness and legality of his sentence. 
, 575 
F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2009).  
See Menna v. New York, 423 
U.S. 61, 62 n.2, 63 (1975). Counsel’s review of the record discloses no nonfrivolous 
issues for appeal on those bases, and accordingly, she requests permission to withdraw as 
counsel. She notes that the plea colloquy was comprehensive and thorough, that all the 
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constitutional requirements for a valid plea were established, and that there was no 
question about the defendant’s competence or comprehension. Likewise, the 
requirements of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, were met and there is no 
basis to raise an issue as to the validity of the plea. We will therefore affirm the District 
Court. 
III. 
A.  
 In reviewing Bryant’s guilty plea, we have uncovered no meritorious claims that 
Bryant might raise on appeal. On September 8, 2010, Bryant entered a plea of guilty to a 
single-count Indictment charging him with unlawful possession of a weapon by a 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Our review of the transcript from 
the hearing reveals no nonfrivolous claims regarding the plea’s validity. See Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The defendant was sworn and advised of his 
constitutional rights. App’x 00030, 00037-00038. The Court confirmed that Bryant 
wished to waive those rights and plead guilty. Id. at 00037-00038. The Court established 
Bryant’s mental competence and understanding of the proceedings, and Bryant 
acknowledged the consequences of a guilty plea. Id. at 00030-00031, 00034-00036, 
00044. The Court also, importantly, established that Bryant’s decision to plead guilty was 
knowing and voluntary and was not the product of any unlawful threat or coercion. The 
Court developed a full factual basis for the plea on the record, based on Bryant’s under-
oath statements. In sum, the plea colloquy was legally complete and thorough. All 
constitutional prerequisites were satisfied, and no questions arose regarding the 
defendant’s competence or voluntariness. Similarly, all Rule 11 requirements were met. 
There is therefore no colorable claim to be made on appeal regarding Bryant’s plea. 
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B.  
We furthermore find no colorable arguments that might be made with regard to 
Bryant’s sentencing. This Court reviews all sentences for procedural and substantive 
reasonableness. See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Procedurally, the District Court must (1) correctly calculate the advisory Guidelines 
range, (2) rule on any departure motions, and (3) evaluate the § 3553(a) factors and 
explain the chosen sentence in a manner that allows for meaningful appellate review of 
the substantive reasonableness of the ultimate sentence. See Gall v. United States
First, the District Court correctly determined the sentencing Guidelines range. As 
part of pleading guilty to a single count charging him with unlawful possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government agreed 
not to initiate any further criminal charges against Bryant. That offense carries with it a 
statutory maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment. 
, 552 
U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007). Bryant appeared for sentencing on January 28, 2011. A review of 
the transcript of the sentencing hearing discloses that there are no issues for appeal 
regarding the validity of the sentencing proceeding because the procedure complied, in 
every respect, with Rule 32. Furthermore, the District Court fully complied with the 
Supreme Court’s three-step sentencing process by correctly calculating the advisory 
Guidelines range, ruling on the defendant’s motion for downward departure pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, and examining the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The parties 
stipulated that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 applied and that Bryant had a base offense level 24. 
Based on the Probation Department’s calculations, Bryant’s criminal history and offense 
level far exceeded the threshold for Criminal History Category VI, which carries with it 
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an advisory Guidelines range of 110-137 months’ imprisonment. Bryant’s sentencing 
range, therefore, became 110-120 months. This range was correct. 
Second, in arriving at this sentence, the District Court denied defendant’s request 
for a downward departure, under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, for overstatement of criminal history. 
The District Court specified its reason for rejecting that request. Although the ultimate 
110-month sentence is not as low as Bryant had requested, it was 10 months below the 
permissible maximum for his crime of conviction, and far below the possible sentences 
Bryant avoided by pleading guilty. The Court noted that Bryant was not a “big time drug 
dealer,” but that he had nevertheless accrued seven adult convictions for drugs, 14 
juvenile arrests, and several parole violations. The Court’s refusal to grant a downward 
departure was both fair and, more importantly, unreviewable on appeal. See United States 
v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332-333 (3d Cir. 2006).1 
 Finally, the record reveals that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally and  
substantively reasonable. Bryant’s ultimate sentence, 110 months, was the lowest 
sentence possible for someone with a Criminal History Category VI classification, for 
which his prior convictions more than qualified him. Notwithstanding these 
considerations, the Court still credited him with a 10-month reduction for pleading guilty. 
See App’x 00073. The record makes apparent that the Court weighed Bryant’s arguments 
and the mitigating factors fairly, and the Court’s rejection of Bryant’s proposed weighing 
of the mitigating factors does not render a sentence unreasonable. See Lessner
                                              
1 Bryant also sought a variance based on the § 3553(a) factors. Specifically, Bryant 
highlighted his lack of stability in his family life during his childhood, which resulted in 
his placement in foster care; the physical violence he suffered while in juvenile detention; 
his acceptance of responsibility; and his desire to make changes in his life. None of these 
factors presents a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. 
, 498 F.3d 
at 204. 
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In short, the sentencing hearing was comprehensive and thorough, and all the 
requirements of Rule 32 were met. The defendant has no remedy and no avenue of appeal 
that can be regarded as nonfrivolous under existing law.  
IV. 
 Having examined the record and the Anders
 
 brief, we agree that Bryant was 
unable to present any nonfrivolous issues in this appeal, and there are no meretricious 
issues for purposes of filing a petition for writ of certiorari. We will AFFIRM the 
judgment of the District Court, and grant counsel leave to withdraw.  
